

SUSANNE LEEB

LOCAL TIME, OR THE PRESENCE OF AN ANCIENT PAST



Ramadi, Irak / Iraq, 2015

Things themselves have agency. It's a philosophical thought that has caught on in recent years in AI discourse as in the sphere of visual art, promising a shift away from the exclusive focus on human perceptions, critique, and actions.

Certain objects, however, on account of their provenance, are regularly accorded more rights than people coming from the very same regions. As Susanne Leeb argues in this critical study of the way antiquities are preserved and exhibited in Europe, it is the ideas about the origins of a supposedly universal culture that help produce the distinctions between "us" and "them."

For the longest time, archaeological museums told the stories of places that were far away, even mythical seeming. However, the recent ongoing conflicts in these regions have changed that narrative: finally names such as Bamiyan (Afghanistan); Palmyra and Aleppo (Syria); and Hatra, Nineveh, and Nimrud (Iraq) have been forced into the everyday European consciousness as the spotlight has landed on the very regions that are not only theaters of war and places of origin for many refugees, but also the source locations of many Western museum collections. Visitors to these institutions will typically be presented with a time span of up to 7000 years, depending on the exhibit – and yet such presentations themselves are the result of much more recent history. Indeed, the objects collected have only "existed" as antiquities, cultural monuments, and museum pieces – occupying a very specific kind of object hood and value-form, so to speak – for the past

150 years or so. Western archaeologists, backed by their respective national governments and with the help of hundreds of local workers across the Near and Middle East/North Africa, began digging for archaeological finds in the mid-19th century.

To be sure, a number of Berlin museums have actively responded to the current world political situation and subsequent (renewed) Central European encounter with Middle Eastern cultural artifacts and people by establishing the “Multaka” program, in which people who have newly arrived in Germany guide other new arrivals through the collections, offering various insights and information about German or Iraqi, Syrian, Jordanian, or Mesopotamian history. Yet for all the enthusiasm for and joy at familiar sights expressed by visitors to the Pergamon Museum – which houses both the Museum of the Ancient Near East and the Museum of Islamic Art – Multaka participants often ask how it is that objects like these are here in the first place; how, for example, did the Aleppo Room, the painted wall panels from a house that once belonged to a Christian merchant, end up in Berlin, now, along with the Mshatta Gate (counting as a “highlight” of the Museum of Islamic Art)?

Such questions necessarily challenge the stories museums tell about themselves. For its part, the Museum of Islamic Art has for some time now framed the objects it exhibits not just with information regarding provenance and associated travel stores, but also with panel texts describing concrete plans for the rebuilding of Syria; videos playing in exhibition rooms also show interviews with people from Samarra, rectifying notions of it being some mythical place from another time.<sup>1</sup> But when it comes to their own history,

institutions have for the most part kept silent. The re-linking of people and things in the context of Multaka is for one thing underpinned by a history of separation – the separation of these cultural monuments from their places of origin and, consequently, their local histories as well.

#### OF PEOPLE AND THINGS

This same history of separation underlies the reason we keep hearing the occasional absurd comparison between archaeological objects and human beings who have fled war and crises. For example, just as French politics rejected distribution quotas (of migrants and refugees), the Louvre offered “asylum” to Syrian cultural treasures. At a conference on the “Politics of Heritage,” writer Sinan Antoon divulged a comment made by a US politics professor on the destruction in Syria: “It’s terrible what’s happening there. The people are replaceable, but all the relics that were destroyed are not.”<sup>2</sup> Arjun Appadurai recently drew attention to the fact that objects are frequently given power of agency and valued as “migrated” objects – whereas migrants and refugees are very often not.<sup>3</sup> In this light, demonstrators’ calls to use the Berlin City Palace/Humboldtforum as accommodation for refugees, or as a headquarters for the pro-immigration group Pro Asyl, appear to be more than “just” provocative commentary; such proposals also re-establish the precise historical contexts that are elsewhere either negated or blotted out when transcendence to the status of world cultural heritage is an active factor.

This chasm between artifacts and people, which is clearly inscribed in the production of museum objects, brings with it the fact that, for all the civilizing self-understanding of cultural

institutions, the histories of collections, and the exact circumstances of how certain objects came to be a part of them, are insufficiently part of their narratives. Meanwhile archaeology – which trades in the material heritage of other regions in the name of preserving an account of civilization early in its history – has long since begun to come to terms with its imperial and colonial past.<sup>4</sup> Summing up the most important aspects, Oscar Moro-Abadia noted that archaeology contributed to colonial discourse by imposing specific truth-constituting knowledge on colonized groups. It painted a romantic picture of archaeological practices, with a particular focus on spectacular discoveries of “disappeared civilizations” in the 19th century. Notably, it disregarded the connection between archaeology as a scientific discipline and as an agent of colonial expansion, thereby justifying the appropriation of material cultures from colonized territories.<sup>5</sup> Not least, archaeology cultivated a specific relationship with time, which has arguably carried over to the present day and which paves the way for such comparisons.

#### THE DIVISION OF TIME

Cultural heritage can be defined as the “totality of cultural objects, traditions, knowledge and skills that a given nation or community has inherited by way of learning processes from previous generations and which provides its sense of identity to be transmitted to subsequent generations.”<sup>6</sup> The term *heritage* is controversial as a genealogical concept. While transcultural art historiography, for example, asks about the hybridity of buildings and objects to keep identity from becoming all too itinerant,<sup>7</sup> others point to a specific temporal relationship: the discourse of cultural heritage could replace a current, contemporary

relationship with things by virtue of their origin, loss, admiration for a glorious past, or romantic melancholy.<sup>8</sup> Tradition only forms in isolation from the present. It is viewed as remote, foregone, lost; and precisely because it is irretrievable, it becomes especially valuable.<sup>9</sup> Added to this is the fact that a certain out-of-date economy of heritage discourse, as Derek Peterson calls it, favors certain monuments over others. In the context Peterson writes about, it is royal houses and noble houses that are privileged in the marketing of history, endangering democratic processes.<sup>10</sup>

If heritage research – now mostly concerned with current cases of object procurement (i.e., production) – appears detached from local time, 19th-century archaeological practice, which generated the lion’s share of objects that constitute Western collections, were markedly all the more so. A fundamental feature of antiquity production is that it prevents contemporary social connections to the objects; indeed, part of the definition of archaeological objects is that they belong to another time. Yet there are several examples (Ottoman Greece, for instance) of ancient objects being weaved into contemporary, everyday practices in various ways, included in different architectures, or subject to different concepts of time: not the time horizon of a great civilization, but of the region’s own agricultural rhythms of production.<sup>11</sup> Compounding this disconnect is the fact that archaeologists have often eliminated the periods of transition and adaptation beyond those that are most central to the Greco-Roman narrative. In Baalbek, for example, German archaeologists obliterated traces of Arabian histories in order to restore the original Roman state and, by doing so, legitimize their own imperial cause.



Picnic / Picnic in Palmyra, Syria / Syria, 2010

These time horizons also privilege or promote certain aesthetic categories. Austen Henry Layard (1817–94) became well-known for his excavations in Nineveh and especially for the books he published about them, in which he styled the figure of the archaeologist as that of an “adventurer, hero, and guardian of civilization.”<sup>12</sup> He pursued a picturesque look and feel of Mesopotamia that was in line with the aesthetic norms of his time, one in which the local population appeared as mere staffage at best – a widespread European convention, as 19th-century engravings and paintings show. Compared to the highly civilized achievements of their ancestors and the United Kingdom (in whose diplomatic service Layard stood), the contemporary population was regarded by Layard as derelict and destructive, finds discovered in excavation always crumbling in their hands. According to Shawn Malley, however, what Layard and others neglected to consider was that the breakage by the local population was intentional – an act of resistance wherein the antiques’ appreciation in value (thanks to the Europeans) was leveraged by the locals to protest the hard labor to which they were subjected, contempt for traditional customs around historical sites demonstrated by the archaeological teams, and, not least,

the carting away of relics, in this case from Assur to Europe.<sup>13</sup> The exploitative mode of procuring antiquities was based on the extraction of two resources: the local population’s labor force and its cultural assets. This went hand in hand with a rejection of the contemporary population’s way of life. The European progress narrative – finding evidence of civilizational achievement in the development from hunter to gatherer to sedentary farmer – did not take nomadism seriously as an economic form. According to an 1848 memorandum for the Foreign Office (“On the Gov’t of the Arab Tribes of the Desert”), Layard planned to make the country productive<sup>14</sup> by having quasi-military units use guerrilla tactics to subordinate and organize Bedouins into stable economic groups for purposes of trade and taxation. The Bedouins’ non-sedentary lifestyle was, in his eyes, the main problem: nomadism is an affront to civilization.<sup>15</sup> The imperial discourse of civilization led archaeologists like Layard to believe that digging and shipping was not only their right, but also their highest duty.

Even today, museums assume the metonymy that the possession of relics belonging to so-called civilizations is in itself proof of civilization<sup>16</sup>: “We rightly argue,” writes Hermann Parzinger, presi-




Führung im / guided tour Pergamonmuseum, Berlin

dent of the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation in Berlin, “that the collections of Middle Eastern art that have accumulated in Western museums through more than a hundred years of division of the finds also belong to Paris, London, New York and Berlin, because they also represent the roots of our civilization.” In 2013, he followed in the footsteps of the civilization-historical narrative, deducing a pressing need for action that obliges “us” to secure and restore the “world heritage sites” in Syria and Iraq.<sup>17</sup> World heritage is the historical term for a transcendence of local times that continues to shape the self-understanding of major Western museums in possession of these artifacts.

All the good intentions of individual people, this museum- and cultural logic is just as implicated in the destruction. In the case of the Buddhist statues in Bamyian, diplomats and culture preservationists had been negotiating with the Taliban for weeks prior to their demoli-

tion. The fact that this piece of world heritage was blown up also had something to do with the clear Western appreciation they held within a (Western) “cult of art.” And thus is the dialectic of “world heritage”: what is thought by some to be a protective measure can itself be the cause of an act of destruction.<sup>18</sup> According to Kavita Singh, the Bamiyan case had to do with an uncompromising strategy on the part of the Taliban to accomplish two objectives: first, to protest international sanctions; and second, to conceal a genocide of the Hazara people, an ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority in Afghanistan. For centuries, no one had prayed to the Buddha statues themselves. The Hazara – who had incorporated the statues into a local mythology, according to which they were a petrified royal family – practice Shia Islam, which the Taliban deems heretical.<sup>19</sup>

The headline-grabbing destruction of the statues was the first recent demonstration of the



„Assyrian Rock Sculpture (Bavian)“, Illustration aus / from Austen Henry Layard  
„Nineveh and Its Remains“, 1849

degree of complexity involved in, and extent of, the intersection of local and global histories. Also with regard to Syria: we hear again and again that besides its brutal public executions and the destruction of antiquities, IS is also feeding the black market with looted objects. Added to this is the fact that both the war itself and Western military presence have damaged numerous cultural sites, as UNESCO plaintively points out.<sup>20</sup>

#### TIME IS MONEY

The UNESCO convention on cultural protection has been in place since the 1970s,<sup>21</sup> and the major museums have signed numerous declarations and codices against art theft, illegal excavations, and smuggling. Meanwhile, there is little reflection about the kind of value production and value assessment that the very act of collecting initiated. Value creation is perpetuated through a process of excavation, appropriation, research, exhibition history, resale, etc. Sylvester Ogbechie has reconstructed the protocol that objects must follow to be transformed into cultural value-forms: First the object must be extracted from its context in a process of accession, then individualized and formalized, so that its accession identity becomes the primary identity that replaces or obscures its former, specifically social significance. From this point onward, the object (now a documented exhibit in a Western collection) accumulates a history of reception that consequently increases its value.<sup>22</sup> Structurally, collectors' items – museum or private – can be understood as goods taken out of circulation. As objects of use, they are embedded in diverse social practices. And as such, museums cultivate a cultural-historical knowledge about them, establishing a specific subject-object relationship that is also a subjectiv-

ity of unavailability and non-consumption. This opens up possibilities – heterogeneous periods of time, contexts of knowledge, aesthetic experiences – rendering them contestable or reclaimable as reservoirs of histories. And yet, above all, such treatment casts them as specific objects of value.

In short, a certain “we” still profits. This is true in many respects, not least the fact that Europe and the United States possess not just significant items, but among the most significant monuments of non-European societies, objects which museum websites tirelessly refer to as “treasures.” The payoff doesn't reveal itself directly, but rather in the slowness with which provenance research is pursued, in the renunciation of “proactive” restitution, or in the rejection of restitution claims as always posed by the wrong authority (as in the case of Nefertiti), in tourism profits or the possession of licenses.<sup>23</sup> To this extent, Ogbechie is right when he argues that possession of cultural assets not only serves to tell us about the history of other cultures and as a creative resource, but also as a tremendous source of income.<sup>24</sup>

Museum, market, and black market are interconnected. When the Northampton Museum sold an Egyptian Sekhema statue to an unknown person for over 15 million pounds in 2014, Egypt's Heritage Task Force (EHTF), an Egyptian NGO, wrote an appeal on Facebook quoting British archaeologist Colin Renfrew, who understood that when legal sales fetch those kinds of sums, the prices of stolen objects on the black market also skyrocket.<sup>25</sup> With posts like these, the EHTF is doing more than simply taking action against the black market. At a panel discussion at the Goethe Institute in Cairo, EHTF archaeologist Monica Hanna reported that numerous children

die every year as a result of being used to burrow holes, or by falling into holes left by illegal digs.<sup>26</sup> She accordingly asks that art theft be treated not only as a question of legality versus illegality, but also as an ethical issue that should be held to the same level of social condemnation as child pornography.

#### HERITAGE VERSUS LEGACY

Emancipatory heritage organizations pursue a strategy of de-marketization when they seek to transform heritage relationships into those of *legacy*. Heritage, following Andrew Herwitz's distinction, is a "site of memory," while legacy can be understood as the "ongoing practice of something from the past, a direct inheritance that is still operative."<sup>27</sup> It is along these lines that the EHTF trains local residents to adopt antiquities as part of their history and not just as a commodity, even if an illegally excavated object can fetch a year's worth of income. In a similar vein, the Palestinian organization Riwaq takes a holistic approach by not only restoring old houses, but, first and foremost, by creating infrastructures for communal life.<sup>28</sup>

And yet even the heritage commodity form has a natural enemy in this same milieu of capitalist accumulation. Michel al-Maqdissi, who was director of the Syrian Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums' Archaeological Excavations Department until 2012 and now lives in Paris, reports that the Assad regime had been planning for years to build a 40,000-square-meter tourist center with 4-star hotels, restaurants, night clubs, and golf greens on the Phoenician site of Amrit, putting its conservation at risk. Al-Maqdissi cites this as one reason the Assad regime would be only too happy to see Syria's "brain

drain,"<sup>29</sup> because there are few resources which can be exploited much more lucratively than heritage and the past. The narrative in which the objects play a role is crucial to this, as with, in the 19th century, the infamous race between imperial powers and their need to justify their own expansion.

#### A HYPOTHESIS

To take our own historical implication in the production of world heritage and its present value-form seriously would be to render museums obsolete as the last bastion of a one-dimensional civilization narrative. And yet, these spaces could, on the other hand, serve as places of legacy through which other stories and histories could circulate, leading undoubtedly (though not in an unwelcome way) to one form or aporia or another. Such transcultural histories would not be tales of a universal civilization, migrating objects, and quasi-*acheiropoieta*, but controversial narratives about the interaction of people, institutions, and organizations. Kavita Singh (who tells precisely these kinds of stories) vehemently defends the museum as a secular space and place that specifically does not lead to identitarian exclusions. For a similar reason (Singh's demand, based on an experience in India, being easily adapted to other local contexts), they could be sites for precisely these kinds of entangled stories, rather than focusing almost exclusively on "treasures" and the grandeur of the collections. Polyperspectivity<sup>30</sup> is one proposal that seldom comes to bear in museums. But rather than simply fostering a pluralism of views and relationships, it would also be a question of openly exposing the aporias of entanglement. Otherwise, we remain trapped in the dichotomy that, as Markus Hilgert writes,

“quite unjustly scientifically privileged ‘first participations’ in social practices,”<sup>31</sup> as opposed to the “successive ‘recontextualization’” he privileges within the framework of scientific, museological, or digital practices. But the real issue is how these two perspectives mutually create one other, and which social practice the latter implies or promotes. It is symptomatic of the current museum debate that this “first participation,” i.e., the first or primary social contexts of things, is usually introduced by those who speak from the perspective of the former or current (re)source communities, while recontextualization through aesthetics and science tends to be emphasized by theorists and practitioners who represent the possessing nations. Museums’ civic-minded self-assertions would be much better served by histories of transformation (and successive recontextualization, including musealization), told in a way that addresses social entanglement – leaving these narratives open to protest and a reclaiming of everything from objects to lore – than by the popular protectionism narrative that has been long embraced.

#### Notes

- 1 “Objects in Transfer” was created at Museum of Islamic Art under the direction of Stefan Weber in cooperation with the special research project *Episteme in Motion: Transfer of Knowledge from the Ancient World to the Early Modern Period* at the Freie Universität, Berlin.
- 2 Sinan Antoon, “The Inheritance of Loss: Collective Memory, Collateral Damage, and the Ruins of Ruins,” paper presented at the annual *Making, Sustaining, Breaking – Politics of Heritage and Culture* conference at the Asia and Europe in a Global Context Cluster, Heidelberg, October 13–15, 2016.
- 3 *Dictionary of Now #4: Thing*, discussion with Arjun Appadurai, Tony Bennett, and Sharon Macdonald at the Ethnological Museum, Berlin on October 10, 2016; event at the House of World Cultures (HKW), Berlin. <http://hkw.de/de/app/mediathek/video/54230>.
- 4 Bruce Trigger initiated the discussion with “Alternative Archaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist,” in: *Man*, 19/3, September 1984, pp. 355–70.
- 5 Oscar Moro-Abadía, “The History of Archaeology as ‘Colonial Discourse,’” <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/bha.16202>.
- 6 Francesco Francioni, “Culture, Heritage and Human Rights: An Introduction,” in: Francesco Francioni/Martin Scheinin (eds.), *Cultural Human Rights*, Leiden/Boston 2008, pp. 1–15, here p. 6.
- 7 See Michael Falser/Monica Juneja (eds.), *Kulturerbe und Denkmalpflege transkulturell: Grenzgänge zwischen Theorie und Praxis (Cultural Heritage and Transcultural Monument Conservation: Hybrids between Theory and Practice)*, Bielefeld 2013.
- 8 “It [the discourse of cultural heritage, S. L.] replaces a contemporary relation by a relation of long term descentance, or of loss, admiration for a glorious past, and/or romantic melancholy.” Daniel Herwitz: “Heritage and Legacy in the South African State and University,” in: Derek Peterson/Kodzo Gavua/Ciraj Rassool (eds.), *The Politics of Heritage in Africa: Economies, Histories, and Infrastructures*, Cambridge 2015, pp. 37–49, here p. 40.
- 9 See the more detailed discussion in Yannis Hamilakis (ed.), *Archaeology and Capitalism: From Ethics to Politics*, Walnut Creek, CA. 2007.
- 10 Derek Peterson, “Introduction,” in: *Ibid.*, pp. 1–36, here p. 4. Peterson writes about heritage politics in Africa, but one look at central Berlin offers plenty of evidence for the monarchy fixation of a certain understanding of cultural heritage.
- 11 See Yannis Hamilakis, “Indigenous Archaeologies in Ottoman Greece,” in: Zainab Bahrani/Zeynep Çelik/Edhem Eldem (eds.), *Scramble for the Past: A Story of Archaeology in the Ottoman Empire 1753–1914*, Istanbul 2011, pp. 49–69.
- 12 Shawn Malley, “The Layard Enterprise: Victorian Archaeology and Informal Imperialism in Mesopotamia,” in: Bahrani/Celik/Eldem (eds.), *Scramble for the Past*, here p. 101.
- 13 See Malley, “The Layard Enterprise”, p. 114.
- 14 *Ibid.*: “Archaeological desire reduces the whole region, with all its varied histories, peoples, territories, and economies to a homology of past greatness and a tangible model for present regeneration.”
- 15 See *ibid.*, p. 115.

- 16 "Possessing them [the antiquities, S. L.] allowed one to lay claim to ownership of the idea they represented: civilization itself." Zainab Bahrani/Zeynep Çelik/Edhem Eldem: "Introduction: Archaeology and Empire," in: idem. (eds.), *Scramble for the Past*, here p. 16.
- 17 Hermann Parzinger, "Welterbestätten als Schlachtfelder" (World Heritage Sites as Battlefields), <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/irak-keine-strategie-gegen-kulturzerstoerung-durch-is-13514109.html>.
- 18 See Kavita Singh, *Museums, Culture, Heritage: Into the Conflict Zone*, Amsterdam 2015, p. 38; see *ibid.*, p. 39, with reference to Finbarr Barry Flood: "Between Cult and Culture: Bamiyan, Islamic Iconoclasm, and the Museum," in: *The Art Bulletin*, 84/4, 2002, pp. 641–59. For more on the dialectic, see Dario Gamboni, "World Heritage: Shield or Target?," [www.getty.edu/conservation/publications\\_resources/newsletters/16\\_2/feature](http://www.getty.edu/conservation/publications_resources/newsletters/16_2/feature).
- 19 See the more extensive discussion in Singh, *Museums, Culture, Heritage*.
- 20 An example in the context of a report on illegal grave excavations in Iraq: "The United States military turned the site of ancient Babylon into Camp Alpha in 2003 and 2004, inflicting serious damage according to an exhaustive damage assessment recently released by UNESCO. Bulldozers leveled many of Babylon's artifact-laden hills. Helicopters caused structural damage to an ancient theater." Diane Tucker, "Brutal Destruction of Iraq's Archaeological Sites Continues," [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diane-tucker/brutal-destruction-of-ira\\_b\\_290667.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diane-tucker/brutal-destruction-of-ira_b_290667.html).
- 21 See UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Paris, November 14, 1970.
- 22 Sylvester Okwonodu Ogbecchie, "Transcultural Interpretation and the Production of Alterity," in: Gabriele Genge/Angela Sterken (eds.), *Art History and Fetishism Abroad: Global Shiftings in Media and Methods*, Bielefeld 2014, pp. 113–28, here pp. 114–15.
- 23 As of 2013, the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation earned 1.6 million euros per year through the sale of licenses. <http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article113784170/Regierung-entwickelt-Software-gegen-Raubkopierer.html>.
- 24 See Sylvester Okwonodu Ogbecchie "Response to Susanne Leeb: Contemporary Art, Ethnology Museums and Relational Politics," in: *Texte zur Kunst*, 91, 2013, pp. 73–82; here p. 79; this is reflected not least in the value of collections, of which little is known unless they are sold. When the World Museum in Rotterdam decided to sell its collection of Latin American and African art in 2012, Sotheby's assessed its value to be between 70 and 100 million euros. see Jan van Beurden, "How to Break the Deadlock in the Debate About Colonial Acquisitions?," in: Valentina Vadi/Hildegard E. G. S. Schneider (eds.), *Art, Cultural Heritage and the Market*, Berlin/Heidelberg 2014, p. 175.
- 25 "Experience shows that when single objects at legal sales reach such high prices, the illegal market of looted object rises as a consequence." Colin Renfrew, *Loot, Legitimacy and Ownership, the Ethical Crisis in Archaeology*, London 2000, p. 90, quoted here in an EHTF Facebook post from August 22, 2015, [https://www.facebook.com/EgyptHeritageTaskForce/?ref=page\\_internal](https://www.facebook.com/EgyptHeritageTaskForce/?ref=page_internal).
- 26 See "The Actuality of the Ancient: Contemporary Art, Icons and Identity," November 20, 2015. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VlDOt4d9moU>. Thanks to Nora al-Badri and Jan Nikolai Nelles for the contact to Monica Hanna.
- 27 Herwitz, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
- 28 See [www.rivwaq.org](http://www.rivwaq.org).
- 29 See "Virtually nothing is left": <https://en.qantara.de/content/syrias-cultural-heritage-under-threat-virtually-nothing-is-left>.
- 30 Markus Hilgert, "Materialisierung des Kulturellen" (Materialization of the Cultural), [http://www.materiale-textkulturen.de/mtc\\_blog/2014\\_002\\_Hilgert.pdf](http://www.materiale-textkulturen.de/mtc_blog/2014_002_Hilgert.pdf).
- 31 *Ibid.*